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Abstract: The Internet has continuously been drawing the attention of states. Governance 
became a central aspect to negotiating tensions between state and non-state actors 
involved in the Internet ecosystem. This paper draws a comparative analysis between 
China and Brazil – with a particular emphasis on the latter – in the negotiations on global 
Internet governance. The primary objective of this work is to identify similarities and 
differences between both countries’ cyber-policies lying at the intersection of security, 
privacy, and surveillance. More specifically, it aims to is to determine if Brazil and China 
can cooperate on a common agenda in the BRICS and assess how the two states deal with 
the role of the United States in Internet governance. The last section focuses in mapping 
the challenges and opportunities that emerge from these dynamics, in particular their 
impact within the BRICS.  
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Introduction 
The main goal of this paper is to determine if Brazil and China can cooperate on a 
common agenda in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) 
concerning Internet governance, in spite of big differences on this issue – in areas such 
as freedom of expression and privacy protection. Our conclusion is a qualified “yes”, 
based upon a shared interest in giving more influence to the United Nations in Internet 
governance, and a criticism of the role of the US in the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN). 
Brazil and China became important global players in the debates about Internet 
governance, and have taken leadership roles among developing countries with an agenda 
critical of the current model. In this paper, we highlight two policies have oriented the 
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participation of Brazil and China in this field: (i) resistance to US dominance; and (ii) 
defence of the UN system as an ideal space for Internet governance debates.  
However, there are many disagreements between Brasilia and Beijing, and most 
of them come from their different domestic political regimes, the way they structure their 
foreign policy towards Internet governance, and how they seek to promote change in 
current global Internet governance arrangements. Even though this does not prevent them 
from cooperating, it establishes some obstacles and limitations to the scope of their 
dialogue. 
In this paper, we start with an analysis of Brazil’s cyber-policies, and discuss the 
creation of the Internet Bill of Rights, the international context in which it was approved, 
and how it strengthened the country’s position in responding to revelations on the 
National Security Agency’s (NSA) mass surveillance. We argue that the approval of this 
bill results from a particular context of convergence between domestic and foreign policy.  
In the second part, we outline the convergences and divergences of Brazil and 
China in global discussions about Internet governance, in particular on the “constitutional 
moments” that led to the creation of ICANN in 1998 and to the World Summit on the 
Information Society (2005).  
The final section analyses how Brazil and China are dealing with these issues 
within the BRICS, and how the theme has been framed in the high level meetings. Also, 
we highlight the possibilities that the group created for a better internal cooperation, in 
spite of their many differences. 
 
Brazil’s Two-level Game Cyber-policy 
Brazil has gradually been building its role as a global player cyber-policy. This is mostly 
due to the development and implementation of comprehensive domestic legislation on 
the issue – also referred to as the Brazilian Internet Bill of Rights (Marco Civil da 
Internet) – and to the country’s activities in multilateral organizations such as the General 
Assembly and the Human Rights Council of the United Nations. As we will see, these 
measures are part of a “two-level game” between domestic policy and diplomacy 
(Putnam, 1988). 
Putnam´s seminal concept describes a political dynamic where domestic and 
foreign policy goals are linked. In seeking to better understand the complexities of 
diplomacy, foreign policy, and domestic policy, Putnam suggests that both national and 
Louise Marie Hurel & Maurício Santoro Rocha JCIR Special Issue (2018) 
100 
 
international levels play equally important roles in analysing government behaviour and 
also a tool to understand diplomatic positions that otherwise would not make sense. In 
the Brazilian case, the unpacking of the relationship between domestic and foreign policy 
dimensions provides insights with regards to how the country achieved a prominent role 
in Internet governance – despite the lack of a strong presence in the global Information 
Technology industry.  
Although Brazil is one of the world´s ten largest economies and a rising power on 
many global issues, its leadership in Internet governance is surprising. Approximately 
66% of Brazilian households do not have access to the Internet (TIC Domicílios, 2017), 
and the country does not have a strong IT industry. This contrasts with China that, on one 
hand, holds a 53% Internet penetration rate (ITU, 2017) but, on the other, encompasses a 
favourable domestic and international market with tech giants such as Huawei, Alibaba, 
Baidu, ZTE, Lenovo, and Tencent. Thus, what partly explains the important role that 
Brazil is playing internationally refers to a specific set of domestic institutions that link 
government officials, civil society representatives, and corporate executives (Santoro, 
2015). This network with positive consequences began in the early 2000s, with the open 
source software movement (Borges, 2010) and the consolidation of the Brazilian Internet 
Steering Committee (CGI.br). 
In 2003, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva became the president of Brazil, commanding a 
complex centre-left coalition. His Minister of Culture was the singer and composer 
Gilberto Gil, a supporter of Creative Commons and similar initiatives. Together with 
sympathetic officials at the Ministries of Science and Planning, Gil engaged the 
government in the open source movement and opened the doors for many activists and 
scholars concerned with digital rights. They established a partnership with the state that, 
in time, went far beyond the original issues. 
Gil was also a key supporter inside the government of the idea that Internet 
governance should be addressed by the UN. Together with the ministers of Science 
(Sérgio Rezende) and Strategic Affairs (Roberto Mangabeira Unger) he created a steering 
committee to develop policies for digital inclusion in Brazil that was announced at the 
opening of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) 2007, in Rio de Janeiro4. 
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Even though CGI.br had been created in 1995, it was only in 2003 that the 
governance model was explicitly defined. The 2003 presidential decree was a milestone 
in the institutional development of the multistakeholder approach in Brazil (Glaser and 
Canabarro, 2015), as it defined that CGI.br’s board would be composed of members from 
the government, civil society, and private sector, and contained one Internet expert and 
representatives from the technical community. 
Both the elaboration of a domestic policy that upheld open software as part of the 
national plan for development and the consolidation of a multistakeholder body for 
national Internet governance laid significant grounds for what would later become the 
Brazilian Internet Bill of Rights. However, the rising importance of multistakeholder 
approaches as part of the national Internet governance also requires particular attention 
to the process through which the Bill was elaborated. 
 
The growth of Internet use affected the legislative agenda, which began to focus on 
users’ rights, duties or behaviour during the late 1990s, when many bills proposed 
rules about Internet user behaviour. Most of them [...] set criminal conduct - 
prohibiting the use of the World Wide Web for criminal purposes, fighting 
pedophilia and child pornography, filtering inappropriate content and anonymity 
[...]. (Rossini, Brito Cruz & Doneda, 2015: 3) 
  
One of the challenging factors was that, while Internet access continued to grow 
in Brazil, the legal responses and the institutional mechanisms were unable to follow the 
changes provoked by social interaction online. Within this context, new legislative 
proposals emerged in response to the growing notoriety of cybercrimes. In 2006, Senator 
Eduardo Azeredo proposed a cybercrime bill that focused on the criminalization of online 
activity and prescribed serious limitations for freedom of expression (Article 19, 2012). 
Fearful of the repercussions that such a bill could cause to digital rights, civil society 
groups and academics pronounced themselves against it (Magrani, 2014; Rossini, Brito 
Cruz & Doneda, 2015). 
In the years that followed, this coalition reacted to several conservative proposals 
of the Brazilian Congress about the regulation of the Internet with its own legislative 
initiative: the Marco Civil. The original draft was available on the Web and citizens could 
give their ideas and suggestions in an open manner through online consultations 
(O’Maley, 2016).   
There are, of course, gaps and contradictions in the Marco Civil. For example, the 
law protects personal data, but does not define what it stands for – a task left mostly to 
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the Data Protection Bill, to be discussed in the future, in a difficult context when the rise 
of Big Data and metadata call into question traditional definitions. There are also many 
discussions on how to deal with cybercrime, a topic that is not the central point of the 
Marco Civil. Notwithstanding, some judges have interpreted the law in a controversial 
way, resulting in attempts to block message services such as WhatsApp due to conflicts 
in criminal investigations regarding cryptography and unanswered requests for 
information from the company (Arnaudo, 2017). This leaves the legislation at the 
crossroads of how to strike a balance between law-enforcement practices and protecting 
users’ rights. 
There was always strong opposition in Congress against the Marco Civil, 
especially from politicians backed by telecommunications companies that do not look 
favourably upon net neutrality – for them, it a loss of market opportunity. Parliament 
waited two years to vote on it – the law was approved right after Edward Snowden’s 
revelations about the American NSA’s surveillance on Brazil, which resulted in a strong 
reaction from Brazilian public opinion, urging the government to do something about the 
protection of rights online (Borges & Santoro, 2017). 
President Dilma Rousseff went to the General Assembly of the United Nations 
and presented the Marco Civil as the base of a future international treaty for the 
multilateral regulation of the Internet: 
 
Time is ripe to create the conditions to prevent cyberspace from being used as a 
weapon of war, through espionage, sabotage, and attacks against systems and 
infrastructure of other countries. The United Nations must play a leading role in the 
effort to regulate the conduct of States with regard to these technologies. For this 
reason, Brazil will present proposals for the establishment of a civilian multilateral 
framework for the governance and use of the Internet and to ensure the effective 
protection of data that travels through the web [emphasis added] (Rousseff, 2013). 
 
During 2013 and 2014, Brazil worked together with other countries, especially 
Germany – also a major target of the NSA – and co-sponsored two resolutions at the UN 
General Assembly (69/166 and 68/167), both entitled “The right to privacy in the digital 
age”. Both resolutions call upon countries to protect the right to privacy, take measures 
to preserve it, and review its own actions. These were the first Brazilian attempts at the 
UN “to trigger a norms cascade” (Abdenur & Gama, 2015) on the issue. The General 
Assembly’s resolutions are tools of soft law and are not binding, but they could be the 
first step to reaching a formal agreement. 
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In October 2013, leaders of organizations responsible for the coordination of the 
Internet’s technical infrastructure released the ICANN’s Montevideo Statement. It called 
for the “need to continually strengthen and evoke” the “unique mechanisms” developed 
for global multistakeholder Internet cooperation, which included the “the globalization of 
ICANN and IANA5 functions, towards an environment in which all stakeholders, 
including all governments, participate on an equal footing” (ICANN, 2013). This was 
followed by Fadi Chehadé’s announcement that he had met with President Rousseff and 
that the government had agreed to convene a global multistakeholder summit on Internet 
governance.  
Civil society groups saw the summit as a potential way of assessing mass 
surveillance, privacy, human rights violations, and the transition of the IANA functions 
(Malcom, 2013). On the other hand, the uncertainty of what would be the main topic of 
discussion and what form this meeting would take generated unrest among the different 
stakeholder groups. At the early stages of negotiations, the Brazilian Minister of 
Communications, Paulo Bernando, argued that Rousseff and Chehadé met to discuss a 
multilateral project that would include the private sector and all of the actors involved in 
Internet governance, and that the initiative would be linked to the United Nations. In spite 
of the preceding controversies and competing interests, Brazil was regarded as a 
trustworthy country to lead the international efforts for a more inclusive multistakeholder 
process (Malcom, 2013). This later on led to the official organization of the “Global 
Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of the Internet” in 2014, also called NETmundial 
conference.  
The signing of the Marco Civil and the release of the Multistakeholder Statement 
during the NETmundial conference portrays the encounter between the national and 
international dimension of Brazil’s position in Internet governance. Prior to that, the 
country had already hosted ICANN 16 in 2003 and the IGF in 2007 and were followed 
not only by the 2014 NETmundial,conference, but also the 2015 Internet Governance 
Forum (held in João Pessoa). This development – with an emphasis on the post-2013 
Revelations – was particularly important for the consolidation of the country as a 
prominent player in global Internet governance. Also, it highlighted the international 
relevance of Brazil’s statements at the UN alongside the implementation of the Marco 
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Civil. Both 2014 and 2015 conferences discussed issues dear to the Brazilian agenda, such 
as privacy, which endorsed the country’s proposals. 
The Marco Civil quickly became an international reference because of its 
innovative content. The collaborative and participative process of elaborating the 
Brazilian Internet Bill of Rights also had significant impacts on policy-development 
processes in other countries. Internationally, the Marco Civil and Brazilian Internet 
Steering Committee’s decalogue of principles both served as international examples and 
the basis for the development of Italy's Dichiarazzione dei Diritti in Internet (Italian 
Declaration of Rights on the Internet) (Canabarro, 2015).  
Moreover, it translated into the digital realm the broad political and civil rights 
prescribed in the Brazilian democratic 1988 Constitution, such as freedom of expression 
and privacy; coupled with new principles, such as net neutrality and the protection of 
privacy in the face of government surveillance (officials can only access data with a 
judicial warrant) or even revenge porn (in these cases, sites have to take down the images 
and content). 
Overall, Brazil’s position and response to curbing mass surveillance are not to be 
viewed as detached from a wider socio-technical (Canabarro, 2014) process of 
consolidating national Internet governance. They link directly to a historical analysis of 
domestic policy-making processes – as we saw with the tension among a criminal-based 
and rights-based approach in the 1990s – and previous multistakeholder experience with 
the institutional development of the CGI.br.  
Furthermore, the Brazilian case is far from being a monocausal process; rather, it 
should be understood as a combination of (i) existing political processes, (ii) the ongoing 
institutionalization of Internet governance-dedicated institutions – namely CGI.br, and 
(iii) multidimensional governance (Hurel, 2016): a specific moment of domestic and 
foreign policy alignment.  
 
Crossroads: Tensions and Developments in Global Internet Governance  
The 2005 UN World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) was an important 
“constitutional moment” (Mueller, 2002) in the history of the global Internet governance, 
and an important occasion to look at the convergences and divergences in how China and 
Brazil perceive their interests on the issue.  
The WSIS expanded the understanding of Internet governance. Previous 
conceptualizations of the term often pinned it down to "technical aspects" (Drake, 2004; 
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Aguerre & Galperín, 2015; Hoffman, 2015) and mirrored the perspective of developed 
countries that had been involved in the Internet’s early days. At that point in time, the 
now-called governance of the Internet mainly referred to bodies involved in the 
management of the infrastructure, mainly the Domain Names System (DNS), address 
space, and technical standards (Hoffman, 2015). In this setting, the WSIS "openly 
questioned the institutional legitimacy of these early governance arrangements [... and] 
emphasized the political implications of the decisions being made through ICANN and 
other technical forums" (Aguerre & Galperín, 2015: 6). 
While developing countries often lagged behind in the technical management and 
coordination of Internet governance, some of them shared the view that the WSIS process 
was a window of opportunity for advocating for greater governmental representativeness. 
This was also the case for Brazil. During the preparatory meetings of the WSIS process, 
the country stressed the need for developing countries to have a say in decision-making 
bodies and processes related to the structure and function of cyberspace (Hoffman, 2015). 
However, in order to understand the positions taken by Brazil and China in the 
development of Internet governance, one might consider taking into account the processes 
and organizations that preceded the establishment of the WSIS.  
The 1990s were a crucial decade to define the international regulation of an 
increasingly global Internet, but still under the hegemonic influence of the American 
government and IT companies. The tense result of the these negotiations was the creation 
of the ICANN and its unique regime based in a civil society corporation that signed a 
contract with the US Department of Commerce and was part of a multistakeholder system 
which put together officials and representatives of private companies, activists, the 
technical community, engineers, and scholars.  
Brazil and China did not look favourably at this scenario. Both countries rejected 
American primacy over Internet governance and supported a solution that posited the 
United Nations and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) as possible 
alternatives to the direct association between Internet governance and ICANN. This 
position was popular among nations of the Global South and had a strong link to political 
mobilizations about a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) that 
started in the 1970s (Bhuiyan, 2014). 
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The NWICO was discussed in the MacBride report6 and based on the criticism of 
the concentration of economic power in rich countries – most notably the US and the UK. 
Furthermore, Siochrú (2004: 208) argues that this was the first time that "a full range of 
information, telecommunication, media and related issues were argued in a truly global 
way". The NWICO emerged as a response to the consolidation of a western-centred 
neoliberal model of development and a calling for the redistribution of international 
communication resources (Chakravartty, 2007). The initiative also proposed changes in 
the regulation of media and telecommunications to benefit developing nations.  
However, global politics went in another direction. Changes within NWICO, 
along with the conservative turn of the 1980s, resulted in a policy agenda of privatization 
and deregulation concerning the information industry. This approach is embedded in the 
framework of ICANN´s multistakeholder model, with its openness to corporations in the 
decision-making process. 
In the 2000s, Brazil and China were both among the key supporters for greater 
engagement of the United Nations in Internet governance, and celebrated the proposal of 
the WSIS. They shared an opposition to the American hegemony in the global Internet 
regime, but had disagreements on other issues. China did not support a multistakeholder 
approach that gave foreign companies and civil society a greater role. Together with 
countries such as Iran, Chinese authorities claimed that states should be in charge of the 
Internet. On one tense occasion, these discussions even led to the expulsion of the 
president of ICANN from a UN meeting, under the claim that he was not an official from 
any government (Bhuiyan, 2014). 
Brazil had a different position. The development of the Brazilian Internet Steering 
Committee was a fundamental piece for the consolidation of the country's own domestic 
multistakeholder experience in Internet governance. Civil society, the technical 
community, and academic researchers were active players in building Internet 
infrastructure in the country in partnership with the government. Brazilian diplomats were 
willing to engage in ICANN’s policy processes, even if they were not entirely 
comfortable with the regime (Lucero, 2011).  
In addition, Brazil was a newly re-established democracy, which cherished civil 
and political freedoms and was experiencing rising mobilization concerning digital rights. 
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The process that would result in open source software policy and in the Marco Civil was 
already going on. During the opening of the IGF in 2007, Mangabeira Unger publicly 
defended a multistakeholder approach to Internet governance and called for a change in 
the ICANN-centralized administration of critical Internet resources (Intervozes, 2007). 
Brazilian leaders did not concur with the prospect of an international regime totally run 
by governments, including authoritarian states.  
The debates at the UN were an attempt to compromise on the issues of the 
stakeholder model and the role of the United States. The Geneva Declaration of 
Principles, adopted in 2003, attempts to link the discussions on Internet governance with 
other United Nations priorities, such as the Millennium Development Goals, and 
acknowledges that greater focus should be given to developing countries. Point 48 
highlights the conflicts: 
 
The Internet has evolved into a global facility available to the public and its 
governance should constitute a core issue of the Information Society agenda. The 
international management of the Internet should be multilateral, transparent and 
democratic, with the full involvement of governments, the private sector, civil 
society and international organizations. It should ensure an equitable distribution of 
resources, facilitate access for all and ensure a stable and secure functioning of the 
Internet, taking into account multilingualism. 
 
There were also many compliments to democracy and transparency. The same 
tension was present in the UN Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), whose 
2005 report stated:  
 
Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the 
private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, 
rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and 
use of the Internet. 
 
The report was very critical of the American role in the system, reflecting the 
widespread consensus among other nations that it was a problem. However, at the World 
Summit, the US government was able to build a coalition around ICANN and the 
multistakeholder approach. It largely explored the fears of democratic countries – such as 
Brazil – that the model proposed by China would be an obstacle to the freedom of 
information on the Internet (Lucero, 2011). 
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Brazil supported the final statements and decisions of the World Summit, such as 
the creation of the IGF as a voice for civil society. But the meeting also stated that public 
policy about the Net is “a sovereign right of states”.  
The tensions between some developing countries and the setting of this 
international regime nonetheless resurfaced on different occasions. In 2009, the Internet 
Governance Forum approached a decisive moment of reviewing its mandate and 
stakeholders took different views on what was yet to be the future of the IGF. During the 
Sharm el Sheikh meeting in November, China, Brazil and other developing countries 
envisioned changes to global Internet governance that would aid in shifting US 
predominance and promoting greater governmental representativeness (Kurbalija, 2017).  
That same year, during the December meeting of the United Nations’ Second 
Committee, Brazil proactively called for the building of a multilateral, transparent, 
inclusive, and democratic regime for global Internet governance in the UN. In addition, 
the country expressed concerns over ICANN’s Affirmation of Commitments, which 
signalled the intention of the organization to becoming more independent. The Brazilian 
representative at the United Nations’ Second Committee highlighted that the document 
lacked the status to grant ICANN an international legal personality or to “change the 
unilateral and exclusive nature of controls over the root directory of DNS” 7. Broadly 
speaking, issues of voice and the participation of governments and multilateral 
organizations in matters relating to the Internet governance regime remained unresolved. 
In early 2010, the G77 and China proposal at the 65th General Assembly meeting 
also suggested that the forum be more anchored within the UN system and that it should 
delve more deeply into policy issues, in order to aid in shifting the unilateral control of 
critical Internet resources – in other words, ICANN’s umbilical relationship with the US. 
The group also endorsed the need to maximize developing countries’ participation in 
Internet governance decisions – principles previously highlighted in the WSIS 2005 Tunis 
Agenda – as well as the IGF as a venue capable of resolving public policy issues “such 
as the unilateral control of the critical Internet resources and measures in enhancing access 
to the Internet” (G77, 2010). 
Resisting US predominance in Internet governance has been a common political 
thread for both China and Brazil foreign policy. The review of the International 
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Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs) during the World Conference on 
Telecommunications Meeting, in 2012, highlighted important divergences. Scholars 
portray this particular moment as a landmark in opposing views and rising tensions 
regarding Internet governance. The WCIT-12 meeting ended in a “diplomatic éclat” after 
it became clear that debates were divided into two main perspectives. Maurer and Morgus 
(2014) take the view that this division was drawn between a bottom-up stakeholder-
inclusive approach and a top-down approach that placed governments at the epicentre of 
the ITU (2014). In this “either/or” moment in Internet governance, China and Russia were 
the main proponents for the empowerment of the ITU and the increased role of states, 
while Brazil was considered to be a “swing state” in-between dichotomies (Maurer & 
Morgus, 2014).  
 
BRICS: Making Policies Converge? 
While we are able to identify important convergences and divergences between Brazil 
and China in the structuration of an international Internet governance regime, one should 
be able to visualize it as a complex composition of different governance models, 
experiences, visions, and arrangements (Hurel, 2016).  
As the Internet ascended as a global policy concern, it also became an ever-more 
central topic to the cooperation and agenda setting processes between stakeholders. This 
section focuses on the role of Brazil and China vis à vis the shifts in Internet governance 
as a "mutual concern" among the BRICS countries. 
The year of 2014 was of great importance to the consolidation of Internet-related 
issues in the common agenda. The almost non-existent reference to Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) security in the 2013 eThekwini Declaration shifted 
from a marginal concern to a notorious piece of the group’s international response for 
circumventing international surveillance and espionage. Among the strategies was the re-
emergence of the BRICS cable that had been first proposed in 2012 and finally gained 
traction in this context (Lee, 2016); the launch of China’s first World Internet Conference 
– an annual conference to discuss Internet policy; the support for the NETmundial 
conference co-organized by Brazil; and the emphatic reference to the “central role” of the 
UN in global Internet governance debates. However, attendees reaffirmed that such 
efforts would not lead to the consolidation of an effective revision of the security 
architecture by the BRICS in the years to come; rather, they were seen as an opportunity 
for creating agendas and identifying converging interests (Stuenkel, 2017).  
Louise Marie Hurel & Maurício Santoro Rocha JCIR Special Issue (2018) 
110 
 
Building on previous developments, the 2015 meeting was perhaps the moment 
when Internet governance gained greater attention. The Ufa Declaration and Plan of 
Action reinforced the need for states to participate on and equal footing, and adopted a 
somewhat similar definition of Internet governance as the one achieved by the WGIG. 
However, the declaration stressed that inclusion referred to the involvement of “relevant” 
stakeholders in their respective roles and responsibilities (BRICS, 2015b). Moreover, the 
establishment of the Working Group of Experts on security in the use of ICTs made it 
clear that, within Internet governance, security had become a topic of utmost interest. 
Emphasis on promoting cooperation, universal access, privacy, and ICT development 
also traces back to the adoption of multilateralism as the best choice for international 
cooperation for Internet governance: 
Considering the necessity to ensure the secure, stable and continued operation and 
use of ICTs, including Internet, the Parties note the importance of the establishment 
of mechanism for the Internet governance based on the principles of 
multilateralism, democracy, transparency and mutual trust and involving relevant 
stakeholders in their respective roles and responsibilities (BRICS, 2015a).  
 
While the BRICS attempted to establish common ground, members often took 
different views on certain subjects. This was the case of India in 2015, when IT minister 
Ravi Shankar Prasad presented an “Indian vision for the Internet” during ICANN 53 in 
Buenos Aires. Taking a turn in the political stand of the BRICS, the vision supported a 
multistakeholder approach and thus suggested the approximation between government, 
the private sector, and civil society in policy-making processes (Prasad, 2015; Sukumar, 
2015).  
Scepticism with regards to the effective capacity of the BRICS in promoting 
policy coordination was also followed by critiques related to the different views of 
Internet governance – Brazil, South Africa, and India, on one hand, and Russia and China 
on the other (Grigsby, 2015; Kleinwächter, 2017).    
Developments within the BRICS are part of the multidimensional interplay among 
and within different networks (Hurel, 2016). Policy strategies laid out by the BRICS are 
not only a reflection of the tensions in the two-level games of each country, but also 
overlap with developments in other international forums such as the G20, G77, IBSA, 
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the case of China and Russia 
(Kleinwächter, 2017) – and should be understood as part of a wider landscape of 
international negotiations shaping global Internet governance.  
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Previous to the formal introduction of Internet governance as part of the 
vocabulary in its agenda, the BRICS focused mainly on promoting cooperation for ICT 
development. However, under the narrative umbrella of developing countries, they found 
common ground within the principles outlined by both the Geneva and Tunis agendas. 
Resistance to US dominance remained a shared concern, as well as support for the role 
of the UN as a desirable venue for political articulation. Gradually, the group became yet 
another space for negotiating common ground and thus shaping foreign policy with 
regards to the future of the Internet – though the degree of endurance for political and 
contextual shifts are yet to tell, in the long run, if such attempts were successful.  
Conclusion 
Brazil and China have been critical of the global governance of the Internet, mostly 
because of the role and influence of the United States in managing its critical Internet 
resources. While both countries have sought to take on a more prominent role in shaping 
global Internet governance, they have done so in different ways. They disagree about how 
civil society should be a part of the system and on the proper distribution of 
responsibilities between ICANN and the United Nations, for instance. 
When we look at Brazil, there is a particular paradoxical relationship between 
domestic and foreign policy. While, the country adopted and developed national 
institutions and multistakeholder mechanisms for Internet governance, it nonetheless  
advocated for a greater UN anchoring internationally. Yet, foreign policy is blurrier, 
especially when we look at 2014 (e.g.: swing states, WCIT-12, NETmundial). 
China, on the other hand, has firmly and clearly stood by these two policy 
orientations. Domestically, the country has also advanced in promoting legal mechanisms 
and policy orientations that further consolidate these standings – i.e., the International 
Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace (Hurel, 2017). Through the establishment of 
national forums such as the World Internet Conference, China has not only sought to 
consolidate their internal strategies in this arena, but also broadcast internationally their 
views on Internet governance.  
As Putnam (1988:434) notes, “the politics of international negotiations can 
usefully be conceived as a two level game”. This notwithstanding, despite their different 
national experiences, both countries converged in moments where the processes in global 
Internet governance were either being reviewed or conceived. This was the case of the 
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Sharm al Sheikh IGF meeting, the revision of the ITRs at WCIT 2012, and throughout 
the WSIS process. 
Brazil and China have also been cooperating concerning the Internet and IT, albeit 
in a limited manner. The BRICS, in particular, offers them a forum where both countries 
can search for convergence and common ground in issues that are important to them. It 
is different at the UN, with more political actors and a bigger agenda, which makes 
cooperation between Brasília and Beijing more difficult. 
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